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Efficient Relocation of Spectrum Incumbents
Peter Cramton, Evan Kwerel, and John Williams
There is no single issue more important to the competitive rollout
of services than microwave relocation.
—  Tom Wheeler, President, CTIA, Wireless Business and
Technology, March 1996, p. 26.
1 Introduction
Since 1934, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has allocated radio spectrum through
the award of narrowly-defined licenses. Changes in technologies and consumer demands have made these
prior allocations far from efficient. In response, the FCC has reallocated spectrum for more flexible use in
bands that are partially occupied by incumbent license holders. The recent personal communication
services (PCS) allocation is an example. Licenses are assigned by competitive auction to promote an
assignment to the firm that can make the best use of the spectrum.1 However, often the new entrant must
relocate the incumbent before it can provide an efficient service. The question we address in this article is:
should the FCC attempt to structure the relocation negotiations? And, if so, how?
In a world without transaction costs, the answer is simple. All that is needed are clear property
rights.2 Then the parties, left to their own devices, will negotiate efficiently. Whenever the value of
relocation exceeds the cost, the parties will agree on terms for relocation. No further regulation by the
FCC is needed. Two factors, however, complicate the analysis. First, transaction costs are not zero.
Different property rights involve different transaction costs.3 Second, the assignment of property rights
has large distributional consequences, which affect the FCC’s ability to reallocate spectrum to flexible
use.
                                                     
1 On the advantages of treating spectrum as private property see Ronald H. Coase, The Federal Communications
Commission, 2 J. Law & Econ. 1 (1959), and Arthur S. De Vany, et al., A Property System for Market Allocation of
the Electromagnetic Spectrum: A Legal-Economic-Engineering Study, 21 Stanford Law Rev. 1499 (1969).
2 Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. Law & Econ. 1 (1960).
3 Harold Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability Matter? 1 J. Legal Studies 13 (1972); Guido Calabresi & A.
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harvard Law
Rev. 1089 (1972).
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In analyzing the efficiency of alternative rules, the FCC must consider how the rules influence both
the reallocation and relocation decisions. For example, in PCS, without providing incumbents with a
share of the gain from reallocation, the incumbents would have blocked the reallocation of spectrum from
fixed microwave to emerging technologies. In general, the FCC may be able to increase the supply of
spectrum for reallocation to flexible use by guaranteeing the incumbents a share of the potential gains.
Two alternative property rights are natural in this setting. Incumbents argue for a right to stay. Under
this rule, an incumbent is free to use the spectrum according to the terms of the existing license.
Relocation can only occur if the incumbent agrees. Entrants argue for a right to move. With this rule, the
entrant can unilaterally move the incumbent. Two versions of this rule arise depending on whether the
entrant must pay for the relocation (right to move with or without compensation). Compromise rules are
also possible, such as giving the incumbent a right to stay for a limited period of time after which the
entrant has the right to move the incumbent. Indeed, this is the rule that the FCC adopted for PCS. We
evaluate the effects of these rules on bargaining outcomes and transaction costs.4
Transaction costs are likely to be highest when the incumbent has a right to stay. This rule puts
incumbents in a position to bargain for a large and uncertain pie, which depends on the parties’ private
information. Presumably, the entrant has better information about the value of relocation and the
incumbent has better information about the cost. This asymmetry of information creates incentives for
both parties to engage in costly strategic bargaining. In this setting, there is no guarantee that an efficient
agreement will be reached, and if it is it may involve costly delay. In addition, since the entrant may need
to move numerous incumbents to use the spectrum efficiently, there is a potential holdout problem. An
incumbent’s bargaining position may improve if it is the last to settle with the entrant. Each incumbent
may hold out for a better deal. Finally, an incumbent may be operating across several new licenses,
auctioned at separate times. Early entrants will not take into account the value to subsequent entrants of
relocating an incumbent. The later entrants are able to free-ride on the early entrants, frustrating efficient
relocation.
Transaction costs may be substantially reduced under a right to move. With this rule, negotiation
may be unnecessary. The status quo of clearing the spectrum may be efficient. In any event, the rule
focuses negotiations primarily on the cost of relocation rather than on the value to the entrant of clearing
the spectrum. Information about the relocation cost may be revealed by requiring that the incumbent let
                                                     
4 We limit our analysis to these simple rules. More complex rules that depend on additional information revealed by
the parties may perform better. See Peter Cramton, Robert Gibbons & Paul Klemperer, Dissolving a Partnership
Efficiently, 55 Econometrica 615 (1987), and Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing A Legal
Entitlement To Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 Yale Law J. 1027 (1995).
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independent third parties estimate the cost of relocating. Then if the entrant pays the cost of relocating,
the entrant is in a position to make an efficient decision to clear the spectrum. This rule effectively shifts
bargaining power to the entrant, reducing the need for and scope of negotiations.
Unfortunately, the right-to-move rule, even with compensation, may not be politically feasible.
Incumbents likely would lobby to block a reallocation that does not make them better off. In the case of
PCS, the FCC modified the right-to-move rule by introducing an initial period where the incumbent has a
right to stay. This gives the incumbents a limited ability to get a premium above relocation costs. This
premium was a way to make the PCS reallocation acceptable to incumbents and yet limit the inefficiency
in bargaining. Furthermore, the rule encourages voluntary settlements. This tends to keep the FCC out of
resolving disputes in individual cases, further reducing transaction costs.
The early experience with this rule suggests that it is largely successful in encouraging settlements.
Most parties are able to agree fairly quickly. Nonetheless, there is evidence that some incumbents are
taking advantage of the long period with a right-to-stay and demanding large premiums over actual costs.
A shorter right-to-stay period would reduce these demands and promote faster, more efficient settlements.
However, such a change might weaken the FCC’s ability to negotiate future reallocations with
incumbents.
We begin by analyzing the efficiency of alternative property right rules in a setting when negotiation
is not possible. Then we analyze the bargaining problem between an incumbent and an entrant under the
various rules. We then discuss the recent experience with the FCC’s microwave relocation rules for PCS.
We conclude by applying these ideas to reallocations of broadcasting spectrum.
2 Efficiency of various rules without negotiation
A corollary of the Coase Theorem is that when bargaining is difficult, property rights can play an
important role in limiting inefficiencies. We begin by making the extreme assumption that bargaining is
impossible. Hence, the parties can only do what can be accomplished by unilateral action. In this case, the
best rule is one that minimizes the need to negotiate.
Three outcomes are possible: relocating the incumbent, terminating the incumbent, and
accommodating the incumbent. Let
c be the cost of relocating the incumbent,
vi be the value to the incumbent of the existing service, and
ve be the value to the entrant of removing the incumbent.
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The outcome is efficient if it involves the least cost or smallest value loss. Specifically, efficiency
requires
(1) the incumbent relocates if c < vi and c < ve,
(2) the incumbent terminates service if vi < c and vi < ve, and
(3) the entrant accommodates the incumbent if ve < c and ve < vi.
Relocation makes sense only if the cost of relocating the incumbent is less than both the entrant’s
value from clear spectrum and the incumbent’s value of the service (case 1). Otherwise, the incumbent’s
service should be terminated (case 2) or accommodated (case 3), depending on whether the entrant’s
value from clearing exceeds the incumbent’s value from continuing operations.
Bargaining is made difficult because both the entrant and the incumbent have private information. In
particular, the entrant’s value ve of clear spectrum is known only by the entrant, and the incumbent’s
value vi of its service is only known by the incumbent. These values are subjective and cannot be verified
by a third party. In contrast, the cost c of relocating is an objective cost, which can be estimated
accurately by a third party.5 We assume that the cost c is estimated by an independent third party and
known to both entrant and incumbent.
Consider the following property right rules:
1. Right to stay. The incumbent has the right to continue its existing service according to the terms
of its license.
2. Right to move without compensation. The entrant has the right to clear the incumbent and is not
required to compensate the incumbent for the loss of its existing service.
3. Right to move with compensation. The entrant has the right to clear the incumbent but must pay
the incumbent the cost of relocating.
Table 1 shows the six possible orderings of the variables c, vi, and ve. For each ordering, the efficient
outcome is given as well as the outcome under each of the three rules, assuming that negotiation is not
possible. The last row gives the probability of an efficient outcome under the three rules, assuming that
each ordering is equally likely.
                                                     
5 To a first approximation, this is a straightforward engineering exercise.
6
Table 1. Outcome under each rule without negotiation
Case
Efficient






1. c < vi < ve Relocate Accommodate Relocate Relocate
2. c < ve < vi Relocate Accommodate Relocate Relocate
3. vi < c < ve Terminate Accommodate Terminate Terminate
4. vi < ve < c Terminate Accommodate Terminate Accommodate
5. ve < c < vi Accommodate Accommodate Relocate Accommodate
6. ve < vi < c Accommodate Accommodate Terminate Accommodate
Pr(Efficient) 1 1/3 2/3 5/6
Note: Pr(Efficient) assumes each case is equally likely. Inefficient outcomes are in italics.
Under the right to stay, the incumbent always continues service. Hence, it is only efficient when
accommodation is best (one-third of the time). Under the right to move without compensation, the entrant
always demands that the spectrum be cleared. The incumbent then decides to relocate or terminate,
depending on whether c < vi. This yields the efficient outcome in two-thirds of the cases.6 Under the right
to move with compensation, the entrant clears the spectrum if c < ve, in which case the incumbent decides
to relocate or terminate, depending on whether c < vi. This results in the efficient outcome in five of the
six cases. The only time negotiation is needed is when the entrant accommodates, even though the
incumbent has a lower value. Moreover, the size of the inefficiency is bounded by the cost of relocation.
Unless the regulator has strong priors about the likely efficiency of relocation, termination, and
accommodation, the best rule is a right to move with compensation. Under this rule, both the entrant and
the incumbent compare the cost of relocation with their private values. The right to stay is the worst rule,
since the outcome without negotiation is independent of the cost and values.
In general, the best rule depends on the regulator’s priors over the six cases. If it is likely that
accommodation is efficient, then the right to move with compensation may perform best. If it is likely that
accommodation is inefficient, then the right to move without compensation may perform best. Notice that
the right to stay is dominated by the right to move with compensation. Hence, the right to move with
compensation should be preferred to the right to stay no matter what the probabilities of the six cases.
                                                     
6 The efficiency analysis assumes that the relocation cost c fully reflects the social cost of spectrum used in
relocating incumbent microwave licenses. This is not the case, since microwave licensees do not pay for the
spectrum in the relocation bands. These bands are managed by the FCC, which tries to accommodate without charge
all microwave users relocating from the PCS bands.
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An important assumption in the preference for the right to move with compensation is that the cost c
of relocating is publicly known. If instead only the incumbent knows the cost of relocating, then the right
to move with compensation may be problematic. Accommodation will tend to occur too frequently, since
the incumbent will overstate the cost of relocating.
A critical feature of our problem is the option to relocate. Without the relocation option, there would
be only two outcomes, accommodate or terminate, and only two rules, “right to stay” and “right to move.”
There would be no reason to expect that one is better than the other without knowing the facts about the
likely spectrum values under each outcome. The possibility of relocating the incumbent changes the
analysis in two ways. First, the cost of relocating c is observable. This makes the “right to move with
compensation” a feasible cost-benefit rule, since the amount of compensation can be determined without
negotiation. Second, the incumbent can always exercise the relocation option unilaterally. This ability of
the incumbent to mitigate damages is the source of the efficiency advantage of the right-to-move rules
over the right-to-stay rule. Without the ability of the incumbent to exercise the relocation option, the
“right to move without compensation” column in Table 1 would show “terminate” in all cases and the
probability of efficiency would be the same as under the right-to-stay rule (efficient only in cases 3 and
4). The “right to move without compensation” puts the costs on the party who is best able to mitigate
damages. The right to move with compensation also benefits from the ability of the incumbent to
mitigate. The entrant determines whether it wishes to clear the spectrum based on whether the benefits
exceed the relocation costs, but the incumbent chooses whether to terminate or relocate if the entrant
decides to clear.
3 Negotiation difficulties under each rule
We now relax the assumption that bargaining is impossible. Instead, we make the realistic
assumption that bargaining occurs between the entrant and the incumbent, but that negotiations may be
difficult because of the parties’ private information. For each rule, we begin by assuming full-
information, so that the parties know whether negotiation is needed to move to the Pareto frontier.
Consistent with the Coase Theorem, negotiations are costless in this case. We further assume that the
parties split equally the welfare gain that results from negotiation. This is the Nash bargaining solution
with two risk-neutral bargainers. This outcome can also be justified as the unique equilibrium outcome of
a noncooperative bargaining game. Specifically, if the parties alternate offers, have equal discount rates,
8
and can make offers quickly, then the Nash bargaining solution is the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium
of the noncooperative bargaining game.7
The full-information analysis is the building block for the realistic case where bargaining is costly
due to the parties’ private information over valuations. For each setting, we assess how costly bargaining
is likely to be by modeling the bargaining as a noncooperative game with incomplete information.
Specifically, we assume that the bargaining is characterized by the signaling equilibrium, in which the
bargainers reveal their private information through their willingness to postpone agreement.8 Eventually,
the parties settle but only after a period of costly delay. When private information is revealed, the
settlement is the same as the Nash bargaining solution, postponed sufficiently to make the information
revelation credible. The bargaining inefficiency grows with the size of the pie under negotiation and
amount of uncertainty over private information variables. Inefficiencies are greatest when both bargainers
have private information about values.
3.1 Negotiations under a right-to-stay rule
Suppose the incumbent has the right to stay. It can, however, agree to clear the spectrum if suitable
terms can be negotiated with the entrant. The settlement depends on the three cases:
1. vi > c and ve > c. The incumbent relocates for a total bargaining gain of ve −  c. Each gains ½(ve −  c).
This is the net gain over the status quo to each party. To secure the value ve, the entrant pays the cost
c plus a premium ½(ve −  c) to relocate the incumbent.
2. vi ≤ c and vi < ve. The incumbent terminates service for a total bargaining gain of ve −  vi. Each gains
½(ve −  vi). To get the incumbent to terminate, the entrant pays the incumbent its loss vi plus a
premium ½(ve −  vi).
3. ve ≤ c and ve ≤ vi. The entrant accommodates the incumbent for a total bargaining gain of 0. The status
quo is efficient in this case, so no bargaining is needed.
An important feature of this bargain is that the outcome depends on ve, vi, and c. In all but case 3, the
incumbent is able to extract a premium from negotiations. The size of the premium increases with the
entrant’s value of clearing the spectrum and decreases with the cost of relocation (case 1) or the
                                                     
7 Ariel Rubinstein, Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model, 50 Econometrica 97 (1982).
8 The parties have independent private values and discount delayed gains from trade. The bargaining involves
alternating offers until a settlement is reached. Peter Cramton, Strategic Delay in Bargaining with Two-Sided
Uncertainty, 59 Review Econ. Studies 205 (1992).
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incumbent’s value of the service (case 2). Inefficiency is avoided, but only because of the unrealistic
assumption that all variables are commonly known.
To make the model more realistic, assume the entrant has private information about the value ve and
the incumbent has private information about the value vi. In this case, the entrant has an incentive to
understate its value and the incumbent has an incentive to overstate its value. This misrepresentation often
prevents an efficient agreement. For example, assuming the parties know they are in case 2, if ve and vi
are each uniformly distributed on the same interval and the parties adopt the signaling equilibrium, then
44 percent of the potential gains from trade are lost as a result of costly delay.9 This is an extreme
example in that it treats the case of greatest uncertainty. However, so long as there is some uncertainty
about the existence of gains from trade, the bargaining will involve some costly delay.10
A natural way to reduce the bargaining costs is to require that the incumbent let an independent third
party estimate the cost c of relocating. Under the assumption that c < vi, then the bargaining has just one-
sided uncertainty. The entrant’s value of relocation is private information, but the cost of relocation is
commonly known. The revelation of the cost c can greatly reduce bargaining costs. In the signaling
equilibrium, when the entrant’s value is uniformly distributed between c and some upper bound, then 19
percent of the gains from trade are lost to delay.11 Whenever the incumbent is able to negotiate a premium
above c, bargaining will be inefficient, because of the delay needed to extract the premium.
The bargaining problem is further complicated when, as is commonly the case in PCS, the entrant
has numerous incumbents to relocate. To highlight the problem, suppose that the entrant must clear all the
incumbents before service can be provided. Further suppose that the other incumbents have settled with
the entrant. Then in case 1, the last incumbent will be able to extract a premium equal to ½(ve −  c), where
ve is the value from moving all incumbents and c is the cost of moving the last one. Clearly, the entrant
would be unable to pay all incumbents such a large premium; hence, there is an incentive for each
incumbent to hold out to be the last to settle. If the entrant is unable to negotiate with all of the
incumbents as one, then timely settlement is discouraged. In PCS, the entrant’s problem is not so severe.
The entrant may be able to work around the incumbent. However, to the extent that relocating one
incumbent increases the value of relocating another, settlement may be difficult.
                                                     
9 Ibid.
10 Roger B. Myerson & Mark A. Satterthwaite, Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading, 28 J. Econ. Theory 265
(1983).
11 Peter Cramton, Dynamic Bargaining with Transaction Costs, 37 Management Science 1221 (1991). In contrast,
the loss could be as high as 44 percent if the relocation cost is privately known by the incumbent.
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A final problem frustrating efficient settlement in PCS is that a single incumbent may operate across
multiple licenses, which are auctioned at different times. For example, a microwave incumbent may
operate across the A and C bands. Since the C band was auctioned over 1 year after the A band, an A-
band winner eager to get to market will not take into account the C-band gain from relocation. Efficiency
requires that the C-band winner share in the cost of relocation. However, until the C-band winner is
determined, this is impossible without regulation. Even if the winners are known, there is still a free-rider
problem. Each entrant has an incentive to let the other entrants negotiate the relocation.
The main difficulty with the right-to-stay rule is that it gives the incumbent too much bargaining
power. Relocation or termination under this rule requires a successful negotiation between entrant and
incumbent. But bargaining costs are likely to be high because of the large pie under negotiation and the
private information about valuations
3.2 Negotiations under a right-to-move-with-compensation rule
Negotiating under a right-to-move rule may facilitate efficiency by limiting the frequency and scope
of negotiations. First consider the bargaining with full information. The right-to-move rule, by shifting the
threat point of the bargaining, that is, the outcome if bargaining fails, alters the pie that the parties are
bargaining over. The threat point under the right-to-move rule is complicated, because there are two
possibilities. The entrant can accommodate or relocate the incumbent. The bargaining outcome depends
on whether relocation is a credible threat when termination is efficient. We assume that it is not, since
relocation is irreversible and costly. If during negotiations the entrant accommodates the incumbent, then
the appropriate threat point is accommodation. Relocation in this case is like an outside option. It affects
the outcome by bounding the premium that the incumbent can extract.12 The parties split equally the gain
from settlement in each of the three cases, subject to the constraint that the incumbent cannot extract a
premium larger than c.
1. vi > c and ve > c. The incumbent relocates for a total bargaining gain of 0. The status quo is efficient
in this case, so no bargaining is needed.
2. vi ≤ c and vi < ve. The incumbent terminates service for a total bargaining gain of ve −  vi. The
incumbent gets a premium of min{c, ½(ve −  vi)}.13
                                                     
12 Ken Binmore, Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling, 17
Rand J. Econ. 176 (1986).
13 If relocation was a credible threat, then the incumbent’s premium would be reduced to ½(min{c,ve} −  vi).
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3. ve ≤ c and ve ≤ vi. The entrant accommodates the incumbent for a total bargaining gain of 0. The status
quo is efficient in this case, so no bargaining is needed.
With full information, negotiation is unnecessary in two of the three cases. If either relocation or
accommodation is efficient, then the entrant can assure the efficient outcome by unilateral action. Only if
termination is efficient is there something to negotiate.
Now suppose that the parameters are private information (the entrant knows ve and the incumbent
knows c and vi). Then again bargaining may be difficult as before. However, if c is revealed by
independent third-party estimates, then the situation is much improved. Specifically, the entrant can often
achieve the efficient outcome by adopting the following simple rule. If ve > c, then the entrant gives the
incumbent c to clear the spectrum (relocate or terminate). If ve < c, then the entrant accommodates the
incumbent. This unilateral action is efficient unless vi < ve < c, since then the entrant accommodates when
the incumbent should terminate. Hence, even with private information about valuations, negotiations are
often not needed. Bargaining when valuations are low can reduce this inefficiency. But if negotiations
fail, the size of the inefficiency is bounded by the cost of relocation.
3.3 Negotiations under a right-to-move-without-compensation rule
Since the entrant can force a move without compensation, the incumbent’s only alternative to
immediate relocation is to terminate operations until settlement. Thus, temporary termination is the threat
during bargaining, and relocation is the outside option for the incumbent. As before, the outside option of
relocation limits the premium the entrant can extract for not forcing termination. Outcomes in the three
cases are as follows:
1. vi > c and ve > c. The incumbent relocates for a total bargaining gain of 0. The status quo is efficient
in this case, so no bargaining is needed.
2. vi ≤ c and vi < ve. The incumbent terminates service for a total bargaining gain of 0. No bargaining is
needed.
3. ve ≤ c and ve ≤ vi. The entrant accommodates the incumbent for a total bargaining gain of
min{c,vi} −  ve . The entrant gets a premium of min{c −  ve, ½(vi −  ve)} for letting the incumbent stay.14
Again, no bargaining is needed in two of the three cases. Only when accommodation is best, do the
parties have something to negotiate.
                                                     
14 If relocation was a credible threat, then the entrant’s premium would be reduced to ½(min{c,vi} −  ve).
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With private information, the entrant can achieve efficiency in two of the three cases simply by
insisting that the incumbent relocate or terminate. Since the incumbent knows vi and c, it will efficiently
relocate in case 1 and terminate in case 2. Bargaining is required in case 3. The entrant will have to
communicate information about ve, if the gains from efficient accommodation are to be realized.
However, since the entrant’s total payment increases in ve, it has an incentive to overstate ve, preventing
efficient accommodation.
When the entrant does not pay the cost of relocation, there is too little accommodation. Termination
and relocation decisions are likely made independently of ve, which is inefficient. In contrast, when the
entrant pays the cost of relocation, then the only inefficiency is accommodation when termination is best
(vi < ve < c). Hence, the right to move with compensation is likely to be more efficient than the right to
move without compensation (so long as the cost of relocation can be measured). Moreover, incumbents
are made worse-off without compensation, so they would probably be able to block such a rule.
4 Negotiations under a delayed right-to-move rule
Despite the lower bargaining costs, incumbents will not like the right-to-move rule. The lower
bargaining costs stem directly from taking away the incumbent’s ability to negotiate a substantial
premium for clearing the spectrum. Hence, since incumbents are likely to have political power in the rule-
making, it may be impossible politically to adopt a right-to-move rule. Moreover, some delay of the right
to move is warranted, because it will take time before the entrant is ready to begin providing service. With
an immediate right to move, the entrant would be able to negotiate a premium for letting the incumbent
stay during this period, even though the incumbent’s service is imposing no costs on the entrant. A natural
compromise is to give the incumbents the right to stay for a limited period, after which the entrants have
the right to move. This was exactly what the FCC did in the case of broadband PCS. The microwave
incumbents have the right to stay for a period and then the entrant has the right to move with
compensation.
What is the consequence of a delayed right-to-move rule? Again, it is instructive to first consider the
case of full information and alternating offers. The bargain from a sequence of threats is just the weighted
average of the full-information bargain for each threat where the weights are given by the fraction of time
spent in each threat, assuming that a settlement is never reached.15 Hence, the settlement is simply a
weighted average of the settlement under the right-to-stay rule and the settlement under the right-to-move
rule. Even though settlement occurs before the transition to the right-to-move rule, the delayed right to
                                                     
15 Peter Cramton & Joseph Tracy, Wage Bargaining with Time-Varying Threats, 12 J. Labor Econ. 594 (1994).
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move has an important impact on the bargaining outcome. The incumbent knows that with each day of
delay, the entrant’s bargaining position improves as its right to move grows near. Let γ be the
(discounted) fraction of time spent under the right-to-stay rule. Then the bargaining outcome is as follows
in each of the three cases:
1. vi > c and ve > c. The incumbent relocates for a total bargaining gain of γ(ve −  c). The bargaining gain
under the right to stay (ve −  c) is reduced by the factor γ, since there is no gain to bargaining under the
right to move. To secure the value ve, the entrant pays the cost c plus a premium γ(ve −  c)/2 to relocate
the incumbent.
2. vi ≤ c and vi < ve. The incumbent terminates service for a total bargaining gain of ve −  vi if ½(vi −  ve) <
c, or γ(ve −  vi) + (1− γ)c otherwise. In the first case, ½(vi −  ve) < c, the bound c on the bargaining gain
under the right to move is not binding, so the bargaining gain is ve −  vi under both threats. However,
when ½(vi −  ve) > c, then the bargaining gain under the right to move is c.
3. ve ≤ c and ve ≤ vi. The entrant accommodates the incumbent for a total bargaining gain of 0. The status
quo is efficient in this case.
The incumbent is now able to extract a relocation premium, but the size of the premium is limited by
the length of the right-to-stay phase. In PCS, clearing the spectrum has no value until the network is up,
which probably takes about 1 year. Hence, with a 3-year right-to-stay period and a 10-year horizon, an
estimate of γ would be about 20 percent = (3 −  1)/10. The pie being bargained over in case 1 is only about
one-fifth its size under a right-to-stay rule.
Now assume that there is private information about ve, but that c is commonly known and it is known
that we are in case 1. This is the case of one-sided uncertainty with a time-varying threat studied by Peter
Cramton and Joseph Tracy. The bargaining cost in this case is roughly proportional to the size of the
inefficiency from impasse.16 In particular, if the possible inefficiency is cut by a factor of five, then the
bargaining costs are cut by a factor of five. Hence, limiting the duration of the right-to-stay rule does
effectively limit bargaining costs.
Switching to a right-to-move rule, even after several years, has a dramatic effect on the bargaining
outcome. The ability of the incumbent to extract a large premium is greatly reduced, since with each day
of disagreement the incumbent’s bargaining position worsens. This makes the incumbent eager to settle,
and bargaining costs are reduced.
                                                     
16 Ibid.
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5 Relocation of Microwave Incumbents in PCS
The foregoing theory is helpful in understanding FCC relocation rules and the actual experience of
PCS entrants relocating microwave incumbents. The FCC has relied on all three relocation rules, typically
providing an initial period with the right to stay and then a period with either the right to move without
compensation or the right to move with compensation. The choice of rules, especially the length of the
right to stay period, has been determined by the relative political power of incumbents and new entrants
as well as efficiency considerations. The FCC had to consider two, sometimes conflicting, efficiency
margins when adopting the rules governing relocation of microwave incumbents in spectrum that was
ultimately reallocated for PCS. The first was the reallocation of spectrum from microwave services to
more flexible use. The second, given that the initial reallocation had been made, was the relocation of
incumbent microwave systems. By increasing the length of the right to stay period the commission
increased the likelihood of being able to make an efficiency enhancing reallocation, while reducing the
efficiency of the relocation of incumbents after the reallocation had be adopted. In contrast, replacing a
right-to-move-without-compensation rule with a right-to-move-with-compensation rule seems to have
increased efficiency on both margins.
5.1 Background
In September 1992,17 the FCC reallocated 220 MHz of spectrum in the 1850–2200 MHz band for
future communications services that employ emerging technologies. A year later,18 the FCC allocated 120
MHz of this spectrum (1850–1910 MHz and 1930–1990 MHz) for broadband PCS. While PCS was
defined flexibly to include a wide range of mobile and fixed services, it became clear that the likely use
would be to provide services competitive with the two existing cellular systems. Given the rapid growth
of cellular, the expected benefits to consumers and the economy were large.
The rules for PCS provided for the exhaustive licensing of the spectrum throughout the United States
using competitive bidding procedures. To do this, the spectrum was divided into six spectrum “blocks”—
three with 30 MHz (blocks A, B, and C) and three with 10 MHz (blocks D, E, and F). For blocks A and
B, the United States was divided into 51 service areas patterned after the Rand McNally Metropolitan
Trading Areas (MTAs). For blocks C, D, E, and F, 493 areas were used, based on Rand McNally’s
smaller Basic Trading Area (BTAs). Each spectrum block and service area constituted a separate license.
The licenses were arranged in three groupings by block and auctioned in three separate events using
                                                     
17 First Report and Order and Third Notice of Proposed Rule Making Re: Redevelopment of Spectrum to Encourage
Innovation in the Use of New Technologies, 7 FCC 6886 (1992).
18 Second Report and Order Re: Amendment of the commission’s rules to Establish New Personal Communications
Services, 8 FCC 7700 (1993).
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simultaneous, multiple round bidding. The auction for the 99 licenses on blocks A and B was completed
in March 1995,19 followed by the 493 block C licenses in May 1996, and the 1,479 block D, E, and F
licenses in January 1997.20
Before its reallocation to PCS, the 1850–1990 MHz band was allocated for private fixed point-to-
point service for businesses and non-federal governmental entities to be used for their own internal
communications. A point-to-point system typically consists of multiple radio “links” of 30 miles or so in
length connected together in tandem to relay communications over longer distances. Each radio link
consists of a transmitter and receiver with directional antennas facing each other at the opposite ends of a
communications path. A two-way link has a transmitter and receiver at both ends to carry
communications in both directions. Point-to-point licenses are site-specific— authorizing operation at
particular locations rather than throughout an area as in PCS— and are subject to a variety of technical
rules designed to limit spectrum use to just the amount “needed.” Licensees in bands allocated to point-to-
point service are protected from interference by a coordination process prescribed by the FCC. Spectrum
is assigned free, and the rights to unassigned spectrum in an area are retained by the FCC for future
assignment.
In sharp contrast to the site-licensing approach used for point-to-point systems, PCS licenses cover
wide areas and are designed to permit maximum flexibility of use subject only to restrictions on the
amount of power into adjoining spectrum blocks and areas. The PCS license is, in effect, an “overlay”
license on spectrum that is partially occupied by point-to-point systems. The FCC decided to protect the
incumbent systems by limiting the amount of interference power a PCS licensee may introduce into a
point-to-point receiver operating inside the PCS licensee’s spectrum block. The power limit protecting
incumbent receivers and the potential for interference from incumbent transmitters serve to constrain the
frequencies and locations available for PCS facilities. In some areas with high concentrations of
incumbents, the interference constraints could prevent a PCS licensee from offering a competitive service.
Historically, when spectrum was reallocated from one use to another, incumbent licensees were
given the right to stay, that is, “grandfathered,” for a relatively long period (typically 10 or more years) to
allow amortization of their equipment investment. After the grandfather period the new entrants would
have the right to move an incumbent without compensation if the incumbent was causing interference,
                                                     
19 Three licenses were awarded under the FCC’s Pioneer’s Preference program.
20 The FCC Report to Congress on Spectrum Auctions, Federal Communications Commission, Wireless
Telecommunications Bureau, September 30, 1997, p. 10.
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that is, incumbents would normally be reduced to “secondary” status.21 Long grandfather periods reduced
the costs to incumbents, and since the new uses anticipated in such reallocations were expected to develop
slowly, a long delay in spectrum availability was considered of little consequence. However, in the PCS
case the cost of a long delay in clearing spectrum could be high given the large value of additional
competition and capacity in the rapidly expanding cellular market. But merely shortening the grandfather
period would increase the cost to incumbents, who might then oppose and delay the relocation by political
or legal means. The need for a politically acceptable means to reduce the delay in band clearing led the
FCC to introduce the idea of allowing new entrants to compensate incumbents for early relocation. This
has the added efficiency of subjecting individual relocations to a cost-benefit test so that incumbents
would be moved only when the value of the cleared spectrum was at least equal to the relocation cost.
5.2 FCC Rule Making
Four features of the evolution of FCC relocation policy are worth noting: the persistent difference in
treatment of public safety and non-public safety incumbents, the reduction of the time period incumbents
were granted the right to stay, the introduction of additional measures to reduce bargaining costs, and the
issuing of cost-sharing rules to address the free rider problem when moving microwave incumbents
benefits multiple PCS licensees.
In January 1992,22 9 months before the reallocation decision, the commission proposed to give non-
public safety incumbents the right to stay for a fixed transition period, after which they would become
secondary. The Commission suggested that the transition period be 10 or 15 years to allow amortization
of existing equipment, but proposed to allow new entrants to negotiate financial arrangements with
incumbents to move them before the end of the transition period. Public safety incumbents (defined here
as state and local government licensees) were to be given the right to stay indefinitely and were also
permitted to negotiate with new entrants to move.
Most microwave interests opposed the commission’s proposal to make non-public safety incumbents
secondary after a transition period. A trade group representing microwave users, the Utilities
Telecommunications Council (UTC), suggested as a compromise that incumbents be given the right to
stay for 10 years, after which new entrants would have the right to move incumbents provided the new
                                                     
21 A secondary licensee is responsible for remedying any interference it causes to, or receives from, primary users.
47 CFR 2.104(d)(4) Secondary users are also expected to cease operation immediately and remain off the air until
the cause of the interference to a primary user is eliminated.
22 Notice of Proposed Rule Making Re: Redevelopment of Spectrum to Encourage Innovation in the Use of New
Technologies, 7 FCC 1542 (1992).
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entrants paid for all relocation costs.23 Under pressure from such groups, the United States Senate passed
an amendment to the FCC’s appropriations bill24 that would have given microwave incumbents the right
to stay for at least 8 years and would have barred the commission from ever making incumbents
secondary. In explaining why he introduced the bill, Senator Ernest Hollings, chair of the Senate
Commerce Committee, which has jurisdiction over FCC legislation, said, “I generally do not offer
legislation concerning spectrum allocation matters at the FCC. I believe that these are matters that are
often very technical in nature and should not be subject to the political process. In this case, however, the
FCC has itself shown a lack of respect for the process involved in making frequency allocation decisions.
The FCC has shown a blatant disregard for the legitimate concerns of the utilities who currently use this
spectrum.”25 Ultimately, the amendment was dropped from the final appropriations bill26 when the
commission decided to act more favorably toward incumbents.27
The intense political pressure from incumbents proved effective. In its September 1992 reallocation
order,28 the commission proposed to give non-public safety incumbents the right to stay during a
transition (“voluntary negotiation”) period, after which a right-to-move-with-compensation rule would
apply. The Commission tentatively concluded that the transition period should be between 3 and 10 years
and sought comment.29 In contrast to the commission’s January proposal, new entrants would never have
the right to move incumbents without compensation. During the transition period any relocation would be
voluntary. After the transition period new entrants would have the right to move non-public safety
incumbents provided they pay all relocation expenses, build new microwave facilities at the relocation
                                                     
23 First Report and Order, supra note 17, at para. 22.
24 138 Cong. Rec. S10346 (July 27, 1992).
25 “Hollings’ Amended Appropriations Measure to Accommodate 2 GHz Microwave Operations Headed for House-
Senate Conference; Computer Industry Leads PCS Proponents’ Opposition,” Telecommunications Reports, August
3, 1992, pp. 1-2.
26 First Report and Order, supra note 17, at footnote 32.
27 The Commission’s September 17, 1992 decision “essentially addresses concerns raised by Sen. Earnest F.
Hollings (D., S.C.). Mr. Hollings had included bill language, to protect the primary status of microwave users, in
appropriations legislation.” Telecommunications Reports, August 3, 1992, pp. 1-2.
28 First Report and Order, supra note 17.
29 The Commission proposed that the transition start upon the effective date of the Report and Order establishing
rules for rechannelization of the higher frequency microwave bands where incumbents were expected to relocate. If
a license for unoccupied spectrum were not assigned to a new entrant until after the end of the transition period, the
incumbent would lose the possibility of negotiating for more than its cost of moving. To provide incumbents a
minimum amount of time for voluntary negotiations, and hence the possibility of sharing some of the gains of a
reallocation, the commission also proposed to give incumbents the right to stay for a minimum of one year from the
date the new entrant is issued a license.
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frequencies, and demonstrate that new facilities are comparable. The Commission referred to such a move
with compensation as “involuntary relocation.”
The Commission also decided, as originally proposed, to give public safety licensees the right to stay
indefinitely.30 This exemption from involuntary relocation ensured public safety incumbents greater
expected gains from bargaining with new entrants than non-public safety incumbents. The politically
powerful public safety lobby and the commission’s concern about disrupting facilities used to protect
human life may explain the more favorable treatment of public safety facilities.31
If this favorable treatment of public safety was efficiency enhancing, it was the efficiency of the
reallocation of spectrum from microwave services to more flexible use and not the efficiency of
relocation of incumbents once the reallocation had been made. Without the support of the public safety
lobby there would be no reallocation from microwave services to more flexible use, but according to our
analysis, giving public safety licensees the right to stay indefinitely is likely to reduce the efficiency of
relocation. Indeed, when applied to public safety licensees, the right to stay rule was likely to reduce
efficiency even more than suggested in the foregoing sections. Public safety incumbents, which were
defined to include all state and local governments, may be particularly bad at achieving efficient
relocation outcomes for two reasons. First, as public or nonprofit entities they are often constrained
legally or organizationally to receive compensation in kind in the form of upgraded facilities instead of in
cash. Limitations on the ability to accept cash compensation can result in public safety incumbents’
choosing to relocate when termination is the efficient outcome or building more expensive facilities when
less expensive facilities plus cash would be better. Second, principal/agent problems may be especially
severe for nonprofit and governmental organizations. Incumbent licensees may not always make efficient
relocation/termination decisions because those decisions are often made by individuals within the
organization with a personal or bureaucratic interest in maintaining a large microwave system.
Incumbents will typically have someone in their microwave systems department deal with the issue of
relocation. A person whose job it is to manage a microwave system will be likely to find many reasons
why the organization continues to need a microwave system— reliability, diversity— even if the overall
organization might be better served by using wireline facilities or eliminating the function altogether. If
this is more likely to be a problem for public institutions, then on efficiency grounds we would not want
                                                     
30 The FCC defined public safety incumbents as operations licensed to the public safety and special emergency radio
services, including state and local governments, police, fire, and medical emergency communications. First Report
and Order, supra note 17, at para. 26.
31 In its January 1992 Notice of Proposed Rule Making, the commission stated, “We recognize that state and local
government agencies would face special economic and operational considerations in relocating their 2 GHz fixed
microwave operations to higher frequencies or alternative media. We are particularly sensitive to the need to avoid
any disruption of police, fire and other public safety communications.” Notice, supra note 22, at para. 25.
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to give public safety incumbents greater rights to stay than other entities. Indeed, we might want to give
them less, because they may be too likely to stay when they should terminate or relocate.
The Commission gradually shifted spectrum rights from incumbents to new entrants. This was likely
to increase the efficiency of the relocation process and increase expected auction revenues. Such a shift in
rights was possible because incumbents lost bargaining power relative to PCS licensees in the
commission’s rule-making process. Once the reallocation had been made it was much harder for
incumbents to reverse it than to block it initially, and the reallocation created a more well-defined group
of potential winners from such a shift. In July 1993,32 the commission adopted a minimum 3-year
transition period for non-public safety incumbents. This was the shortest time in the range it proposed in
September 1992.33 The transition period began with a 2-year “voluntary negotiation period,” during which
incumbents had the right to stay and were not required to negotiate. After the two-year period, a new
entrant could initiate a 1-year “mandatory negotiation period” during which both parties would be
required to bargain in good faith. After the mandatory negotiation period, a new entrant could apply for
involuntary relocation of an incumbent fixed microwave facility.
In February 1997,34 the commission shortened the voluntary negotiation period for non-public safety
microwave incumbents in the PCS C, D,E, and F blocks by 1 year, establishing a 1-year voluntary
negotiation period followed by a 1-year mandatory period. The voluntary negotiation period for the PCS
A and B blocks remained two years, ending on April 5, 1997.
The spectrum rights of public safety incumbents were scaled back as well. In July 1993,35 the
commission narrowed the group that was granted the right to stay indefinitely. Only facilities on which
the majority of use is for police, fire, or emergency medical services involving safety of life or property
were to be exempt from the involuntary relocation process. In March 1994,36 the commission decided to
end this exemption. The Commission established a 4-year voluntary negotiation period followed by a 1-
                                                     
32 Third Report and Order and Memorandum Opinion and Order Re: Redevelopment of Spectrum to Encourage
Innovation in the Use of New Technologies, 8 FCC 6589 (1993).
33 The transition began later, however, with the acceptance of applications for new technology services. As it turned
out, the voluntary negotiation period for PCS licensees in the A and B blocks began on April 5, 1995. Second Report
and Order Re: Amendment to the commission’s Rules Regarding a Plan for Sharing the Costs of Microwave
Relocation, 12 FCC 2705 (1997). Under the initial proposal, the transition would have begun in December 1993, on
the effective date of the rule for re-channelizing higher frequency microwave bands. Second Report and Order Re:
Redevelopment of Spectrum to Encourage Innovation in the Use of New Technologies, 8 FCC 6495 (1993).
34 Second Report and Order, supra note 33.
35 Third Report and Order, supra note 32.
36 Memorandum Opinion and Order Re: Redevelopment of Spectrum to Encourage Innovation in the Use of New
Technologies, 9 FCC 1943 (1994).
20
year mandatory negotiation period. After that, a PCS licensee could move a public safety incumbent if it
provided the incumbent fully comparable relocation facilities and paid all relocation costs. The
Commission also required that the replacement facilities be fully built and tested before an incumbent was
compelled to relocate. In November 1994,37 the commission shortened the voluntary negotiation period
for public safety incumbents to 3 years, and increased the mandatory period to 2 years. The total time that
public safety incumbents were given the right to stay remained the same, but they were required to start
negotiating earlier. In February 1997, when the commission shortened the voluntary negotiation period
for non-public safety incumbents in the C, D, E, and F blocks, it did not change the negotiation periods
for public safety incumbents in these blocks.
In April 1996,38 the commission put a time limit on the application of the right-to-move-with-
compensation rule, after which incumbents would be reduced to secondary status. The Commission
required that microwave incumbents still operating in the 2 GHz band ten years after the voluntary period
had commenced will be required to pay for their own relocation expenses or terminate operations if an
emerging technology licensee requires use of the spectrum.39 The Commission’s decision took into
account an efficiency margin not discussed in the foregoing analysis— the incumbents’ investment
decision when equipment wears out. The Commission argued that incumbents will have too little
incentive to relocate to another band on their own when their equipment needs to be replaced if new
entrants are required to pay for all costs of relocating from the current band.40
In addition to circumscribing the spectrum rights of incumbents, the commission took several other
actions to reduce negotiation costs. It decided in July 199341 that if incumbents and new entrants could
not agree on whether replacement facilities were comparable, the negotiating parties were required to use
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) before referring the case to the commission. Then in November
1994,42 the commission decided that independent estimates of the cost to replace an existing facility be
used in resolving disputes between incumbents and new service providers in the case of mandatory
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New Technologies, 9 FCC 779 (1994).
38 First Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making Re: Amendment to the commission’s Rules
Regarding a Plan for Sharing the Costs of Microwave Relocation, 11 FCC 8825 (1996).
39 The obligation to pay relocation costs sunsets ten years after the voluntary negotiation period begins for the first
emerging technology licensees in a service. This is April 4, 2005 for PCS licensees. Microwave Relocation, supra
note 38, at para. 65.
40 Microwave Relocation, supra note 38, at para. 67.
41 Third Report and Order, supra note 32.
42 Second Memorandum Opinion, supra note 37.
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relocation. In April 1996,43 the commission clarified rules for mandatory negotiations, holding that
common law principles be considered when interpreting the obligation to negotiate in good faith, that the
parties be required to share pertinent information, and that providing cost estimates for comparable
facilities be the burden on the party alleging bad faith. Specific factors by which to judge good faith were
also laid out. The Commission went on to define “comparable” facilities as those that are equivalent with
respect to communications throughput, system reliability, and operating costs. Furthermore, the order
limited compensation to incumbents for increased recurring costs associated with the replacement
facilities to a 5-year time period during an involuntary relocation and limited reimbursement of
incumbents’ transactional costs during an involuntary relocation to 2 percent of the “hard costs.”
The Commission also provided a cost-sharing mechanism to reduce the free-rider problem that could
arise when relocating a microwave link freed up spectrum for more than one PCS licensee. Under the
plan, adopted in April 1996,44 PCS licensees receive “reimbursement rights” once they sign a relocation
agreement with a microwave incumbent. Subsequent PCS licensees that would have caused harmful
interference to relocated links are required to reimburse the holder of the reimbursement rights for a pro
rata share of the actual cost of relocating microwave facilities, excluding any premium that the PCS
licensee might pay to the incumbent as an incentive to move during the voluntary negotiation period. The
formula provides for straight-line depreciation of the reimbursement rights over a 10-year period so later
entering PCS licensees, who benefit less from the microwave relocation, pay less of the relocation costs.
The Commission established a cap of $250,000 reimbursement for each microwave link plus an
additional $150,000 where a new tower is required. Moreover, this cost-sharing plan would apply to co-
channel interference only. In August 1996,45 the commission designated the Personal Communications
Industry Association (PCIA) and the Industrial Telecommunications Association (ITA) as the
clearinghouses to administer the commission’s cost-sharing plan for microwave relocation. In February
1997,46 the commission decided to allow incumbents who voluntarily relocate themselves to collect
reimbursement under the same cost-sharing formula applied to PCS licensees.
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5.3 Experience
The spectrum currently allocated to PCS contained approximately 4,500 microwave links before the
reallocation.47 The licensees were mostly petroleum companies, utilities, railroads, and local
governments. By January 1998 over half of these links had been moved out of the band.48 About 90
percent of the moved links relocated to alternative microwave bands, and 10 percent shifted to fiber or
copper wire, or ceased operation.49
The experience with microwave relocation in PCS seems roughly consistent with the above theory.
While there are no public records of payments made for relocation, it appears that the microwave
incumbents have been able to extract some premiums, but that the premiums have been limited. Good
faith negotiations appear to have been the norm, although there are numerous reports of large demands for
rapid settlement. According to Thomas Wheeler, president of the Cellular Telecommunications Industry
Association (CTIA), “[V]oluntary relocation negotiations with the majority of microwave incumbents in
critical sections in each of the newly licensed markets, notably the urban areas where potential subscriber
population is the greatest, have been or are being conducted in good faith by all parties.”50 But there have
been reports of incumbents demanding premiums of several times actual relocation costs to relocate
before the involuntary relocation period, as illustrated by the following specific case.
The PCS licensee surveyed the incumbent’s 1.9 GHz system and an equipment
manufacturer quoted a relocation price of $225,000 per link, inducing an upgrade of
equipment. The incumbent demanded $400,000 in cash for each relocated link. ... The
PCS licensee’s negotiator took the incumbent’s demand back to the licensee for
consideration. During the interim, the incumbent attended a seminar on the “value” of
these frequencies to PCS licensees. The incumbent then rescinded its $400,000 offer and
stated that it would not take less than $1,200,000 per link.51
While providing incumbents with a limited right to stay may have increased transaction costs in
some cases, in many cases there was little or no efficiency loss. Before the PCS entrant is ready to begin
service, accommodation is efficient. Even after service is up, many links can be worked around. For
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example, NextWave, the largest winner in the C-block auction, estimated that of the approximately 500
microwave links in its markets 40 percent will not require immediate relocation.52 Relocation is expensive
and often unnecessary.
The right to move with compensation is especially desirable under these circumstances. There is no
bias toward relocation. The sole bias is for accommodation over termination. Since termination is least
likely to be desirable, this rule is apt to minimize transaction costs. Giving the incumbent the right to stay
for a limited period of time increases transaction costs, but the increase is bounded. However, such a
concession to the incumbent may be just what is needed to get the incumbents to agree to the reallocation.
6 Application to Digital Television
The approach used to relocate microwave incumbents in PCS spectrum may prove useful in thinking
about how to shift other occupied spectrum to more valuable uses. For example, the allocation of
television spectrum has become far from efficient. At present, 402 MHz of prime spectrum is devoted to
providing analog television service (NTSC). With more efficient digital technology, an equivalent free
over-the-air television service could be provided using less than one-third of this spectrum.53 Thus it
would appear at least technologically possible to free as much as two-thirds of the current VHF and UHF
TV spectrum for flexible use with no reduction in free service.54 While the current plan for transitioning
to DTV is well underway and unlikely to be altered significantly, it may be possible to produce a more
efficient outcome with marginal rule changes modeled after the approaches used in PCS.
As part of its proceeding on the implementation of digital television, the FCC has considered how to
recover spectrum now devoted to analog television. The FCC has assigned all existing full-service (full-
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53 There is no market with more than 26 channels of service except Los Angeles, which has 33. FCC Public Notice
“Television Channel Utilization,” April 3, 1997. If, as often claimed, a single DTV channel can accommodate at
least 4 channels of standard definition service, then the amount of spectrum needed for 26 channels in an area is
(26/4)×6 = 39 MHz. Tripling this to 117 MHz would allow the replication of this capacity throughout the United
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54 The amount of spectrum available for flexible use could be substantially less if the goal is not just to maintain the
current level of free TV but to increase it either in quantity or quality. The FCC’s original purpose in initiating the
proceeding that led to DTV was to increase the quality of free TV from standard definition to high definition.
However, the rules finally adopted by the FCC allow broadcasters to decide between HDTV and other uses of the
digital signal, including additional standard definition services on either a free or subscription basis. Broadcasters
are required only to provide one free service in standard definition.
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power) television broadcasters an additional 6 MHz channel for digital broadcasting.55 By 2006,
broadcasters are required to return one of their channels, and they could also be required to change their
DTV channels to permit the aggregation of recovered spectrum into contiguous blocks.56 The Balanced
Budget Act of 1997 bars the commission from renewing analog broadcasting licenses to provide service
after 2006, with several exceptions.57 If any of the exceptions prevail in a television market, the
commission must extend the date in that market. The most important exception is if 15 percent or more of
the television households in the market do not have at least one digital television receiver or analog
television with a digital converter capable of receiving the digital signals of the television stations
licensed in that market and do not subscribe to a multichannel video programming service (for example,
cable or direct broadcast satellite) that carries one of the digital signals of each television broadcaster in
the market. The act also requires that by 2002 the commission auction licenses for the recovered
television spectrum.
A potential drawback to clearing NTSC spectrum by this approach is that broadcasters have no
incentive to return their analog channels to the government before required, even when it would be
efficient to do so. Under the current plan, analog channels could continue in use well beyond 2006 if the
commission finds that any of the exceptions specified in the Balanced Budget Act exist. Also, until the
spectrum is auctioned for new uses no other private party has a significant incentive to see that the analog
channels are turned back quickly, because no private party has the right to spectrum that will be released
when the channels are returned.
In this context the analog television channels are like the incumbent microwave users in the PCS
case. The Commission could create and immediately auction overlay licenses in the television
broadcasting band analogous to PCS licenses, where the new entrant would have the right to use any
unoccupied spectrum, including spectrum that becomes available by moving an NTSC television channel.
Our analysis suggests that a relocation mechanism to consider in this context would be to give the overlay
licensee the right to move with compensation.
There are some issues to resolve, however. The most significant arises from the need to consider the
interests of television viewers as well as those of licensees. Terminating an NTSC channel early for a cash
payment to the licensee could be inefficient even if both the new entrant and the incumbent licensee are
better off, because viewers with NTSC television sets would be worse off. One possible way to address
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this problem would be also to require the overlay licensee to compensate viewers by providing
comparable free replacement service, including any necessary receiving equipment to allow such service
to be displayed on standard NTSC receivers. The most obvious way to do this would be for the overlay
licensee to provide viewers with digital-to-analog converter boxes and to devote a portion of a DTV
channel’s capacity (whether its own or leased) to providing a replacement service that could be displayed
in the NTSC format with the use of these converter boxes. This raises questions as to who should be
eligible to receive free converter boxes and for how long. Should households who can receive the
programming over cable or who already have DTV television sets be eligible? Should households that
have two or more NTSC television sets that are not connected to cable and receive their signals over the
air be entitled to multiple converter boxes? One approach would be to use the standard set in the Balanced
Budget Act for extending the termination date for analog broadcast stations. An additional complication
with this approach is that the cost of providing a converter box for one channel is virtually the same as for
multiple channels. Unless there is a single overlay licensee a cost-sharing mechanism would be needed to
pay for the equipment when NTSC channels are moved by multiple overlay licensees.
There is also a question of how to compensate the NTSC licensees for moving before 2006. One
possibility is to require the overlay licensee to provide the moved NTSC licensee with free carriage on a
DTV channel with comparable coverage to the removed NTSC channel. This would ensure continued
provision of the broadcaster’s current free service pending the build-out of its own DTV station.58 For this
to provide adequate compensation the overlay licensee must also satisfy the requirement described above
that a sufficient proportion of television viewers in the relevant television market have equipment to
display the signal. An additional complication is that to provide large contiguous blocks of spectrum it
may be necessary to “repack” the DTV channels. Under the current FCC plan, after the analog stations
have been shut down the FCC can require DTV licensees to move to other frequencies. If instead, the
FCC auctioned overlay licenses now, it could give the overlay licensees the right to move a DTV licensee
to an equivalent channel if it pays for all relocation costs. One question with this alternative is whether
efficient repacking can be achieved with the television band divided among more than one overlay
licensee. With multiple overlay licensees, negotiations would be required to move a DTV licensee from
within the frequency boundaries of one overlay licensee to within the boundaries of another.
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The main possible advantage of this approach compared to the current policy is that analog television
channels would be removed more quickly where the value of the new use is greater than the cost of band
clearing. It would provide a new mechanism for removing analog television stations prior to 2006 and
could reduce the number of markets after 2006 where analog stations could remain under the exemption
limiting the loss of service to no more than 15 percent of television households. There are difficult issues
to be resolved that are peculiar to this spectrum, because of the public good nature of broadcasting and
other potentially conflicting policies. However, the potential gain from an efficient allocation of this
valuable spectrum could be large. Moreover, the procedural risks are reduced by building on the
knowledge and experience gained in the successful application of the approach in PCS.
7 Conclusion
As a result of technological progress, prior spectrum allocations are far from efficient. To correct this
problem the FCC has begun reallocating encumbered spectrum. The assignment of property rights
between entrant and incumbent plays an important role in determining whether this spectrum is put to its
best use. Efficient relocation is promoted by establishing a relocation rule that minimizes the need for
costly negotiation. An indefinite right to stay gives incumbents too much power in negotiating large
premiums for relocating or terminating. Holdout problems can lead to large bargaining costs. These costs
can be reduced by giving entrants the right to move the incumbent. This rule works especially well when
the cost of relocating the incumbent can be objectively estimated and entrants are required to compensate
incumbents for clearing the spectrum. Under this right-to-move-with-compensation rule, both the entrant
and the incumbent compare the cost of relocation with their private values. If the entrant’s value of clear
spectrum is greater than the cost of relocation, the entrant will insist on relocation. Then the incumbent
will terminate or relocate depending on whether the incumbent’s value of the spectrum is less or more
than the cost of relocating. Efficiency occurs without negotiation in all but one case. Negotiation is
needed only when the incumbent’s value of the spectrum is less than the entrant’s value and the entrant’s
value is less than the cost of relocating. In this case, the entrant may inefficiently accommodate the
incumbent if negotiations fail. However, this negotiation is simplified by the fact that the amount under
negotiation is bounded by the cost of relocation.
The right-to-move-with-compensation rule also has desirable distributional consequences. It
guarantees that the incumbent is at least as well off as under the prior allocation and strictly better off
whenever the incumbent terminates. Hence, this rule may be acceptable to politically powerful
incumbents, yet, unlike the right-to-stay rule, the right-to-move-with-compensation rule favors the
incumbent while minimizing the need for difficult negotiation.
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Adopting an efficient relocation rule is especially important in a setting like PCS, where the
reallocation brings much needed competition to wireless telephony. The benefits to consumers from a
rapid introduction of competition in wireless services are substantial. Paying attention to the transaction
costs associated with different rules is essential to reaping these consumer gains.
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